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ASEAN’s Balancing Act: Why Maritime Security Will Define the Next Indo-Pacific Order


By Anshul Sharma


Introduction


ASEAN today is home to over 682 million people and accounts for roughly 7.3% of global GDP, establishing it as a demographic and economic powerhouse in Asia. Roughly 24% of global seaborne trade by volume passes through the Strait of Malacca, one of the most critical Indo-Pacific chokepoints.


Global maritime transport remains the backbone of the world economy. According to the latest UNCTAD“Review of Maritime Transport 2024”, over 80% of international trade in goods is carried by sea. This reliance underlines why control over sea-lanes, chokepoints, and port infrastructure is strategically consequential. ASEAN’s dependence on key maritime chokepoints places it at the centre of Indo-Pacific competition, where preserving autonomy now rests on practical maritime cooperation rather than abstract neutrality. By aligning with ASEAN’s emphasis  on international law, freedom of navigation, and peaceful dispute settlement, India’s support for ASEAN-centric maritime norms strengthens the region’s institutional resilience at a time when great-power rivalry risks eroding smaller states strategic space. ASEAN’s relevance in the Indo-Pacific will be determined not by declarations of neutrality, but by its ability to institutionalise maritime cooperation and translate it into credible regional security outcomes amid intensifying great-power rivalry.


This article argues that maritime security has become ASEAN’s most effective instrument for preserving strategic autonomy in an increasingly polarised order. In this context, cooperation with external partners that support ASEAN centrality becomes increasingly important. India’s maritime engagement with ASEAN offers a practical framework for strengthening regional maritime capacity, safeguarding critical sea lanes, and reinforcing a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.


ASEAN’s Strategic Dilemma at Sea


ASEAN aims to preserve its place at the core of regional security and cooperation frameworks as part of Indo-Pacific diplomacy, even as major powers such as China and the United States jostle for influence, while seeking to avoid entanglement in the US–China rivalry in the region. While ASEAN states are pursuing bilateral security and economic commitments to manage great-power pressures, internal divisions complicate collective maritime strategy. Some member states, such as Cambodia and Laos, have been perceived as aligning more closely with China, often softening ASEAN’s collective positions. In contrast, claimant states such as Vietnam and the Philippines have taken firmer stances in response to developments in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, Singapore and Indonesia continue to maintain balanced relations with major powers to preserve strategic autonomy. ASEAN’s institutional centrality enables it to navigate intensifying great-power competition while preserving strategic autonomy. By anchoring regional engagement in consensus-driven and multilateral frameworks, ASEAN avoids formal alignment while maintaining relevance in an increasingly polarised Indo-Pacific order. This dynamic is reflected in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), formally adopted by ASEAN leaders, which states that “it expresses a commitment to multilateralism and inclusive cooperation through”(World Insight) ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, thereby reaffirming ASEAN centrality even as individual member states continue to hedge independently.

 

Why Maritime Security Matters Now


The operational core of the global economy increasingly travels by sea. Nearly all ASEAN states are maritime or littoral and over one-third of global maritime trade passes through Indo-Pacific chokepoints such as the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits. These few vulnerable sea lanes and coastal zones anchor the energy flows, food supply chains, and insurance costs. So, any disruption, whether from conflict, accident, or other coercive practices, can lead to obstruction of major supply chains.


The stakes extend higher because of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Control over the EEZ determines access to fisheries, offshore minerals, and many major emerging blue economy assets such as undersea cables and offshore renewables. Even rival states share incentives to prevent any mishaps because the costs of failure are mutual and prohibitively expensive for the state's interests. Because maritime interests are fundamentally transactional, this raises the grey-zone pressure, which makes coordination unavoidable and chokepoints increasingly subject to grey-zone coercion on trade flows. A recent illustration of the cooperation is “the first-ever joint sail of the Philippines and Indian navies in the South China Sea in August 2025 as a part of broader efforts to strengthen maritime security cooperation.”(Reuters)


Yet maritime security in the South China Sea is characterised by a dual dynamic of cooperation and contestation. The Sandy Cay episode, in which China and the Philippines both raised their national flags on contested features, illustrates the persistence of symbolic and strategic rivalry in disputed waters.(The Washington Post)

 

Why India Is a Credible Partner


India's comparative advantage as a major maritime partner primarily lies in its geography and stable political posture. India can assert a stabilising presence from the Gulf of Aden to the South China Sea and adjoining western Pacific waters. India’s tradition of non-alignment and emphasis on strategic autonomy allows India to work closely with the United States, ASEAN, and others without pushing a zero-sum partnership.


This is reinforced by a long history of naval training and humanitarian deployment with a primary focus on capacity building. India has demonstrated this through bringing practical capabilities to the table for the partner states. India’s credibility is reinforced through regular naval exercises such as the Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX) and the ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise. Beyond exercises, New Delhi has extended lines of credit and supported port infrastructure development, exemplified by its assistance in the redevelopment of Port Louis and joint monitoring of the Chagos maritime protected area with Mauritius (Reuters), Together, these initiatives underscore India’s sustained commitment to maritime capacity building. India’s credibility as a maritime partner is often assessed through the lens of its complicated relationship with China. Border tensions and strategic rivalry have undeniably sharpened New Delhi’s security calculations. Yet these pressures have not pushed India into rigid bloc politics. Instead, India has pursued a strategy of calibrated balancing, strengthening naval capabilities, deepening partnerships. Expanding its Indo-Pacific engagement while preserving its long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy.


This posture is particularly visible in India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). While critics frequently portray the Quad as an anti-China alliance, India has consistently framed it as a platform for advancing a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific. Cooperation within the grouping has centred on practical initiatives, including maritime domain awareness, disaster relief coordination, resilient infrastructure, and emerging technologies. By maintaining this framing, India signals that its partnerships are guided less by confrontation and more by the pursuit of regional stability and a rules-based order.

 

From Principle to Practice: Policy Proposals


ASEAN and India already acknowledge the importance of maritime cooperation in their joint statements and summit communiqués. At the 22nd ASEAN-India Summit, both sides renewed 2026 as the year of ASEAN-India maritime cooperation.

The dilemma unfolds across three levels: institutional legitimacy, operational capability, and coordination at sea. Translating political consensus into operational outcomes requires practical, low-risk mechanisms. Two policy approaches merit consideration:


1.Issue-Based Maritime Coordination Cells

Rather than creating another broad regional framework, India and willing ASEAN states should pilot small and issue-based coordination cells. Focusing on real-time reporting of incidents, dispute mediation, and maritime emergency communication. These would function on a voluntary basis and produce non-binding operational guidelines within a fixed timeline. These cells would concentrate on three priorities. First, Search and Rescue (SAR), enabling rapid information sharing and coordination during maritime distress incidents and accidents. Second, grey-zone encounters, improving situational awareness of non-kinetic maritime pressure such as navigation harassment, militia activity, and other coercive practices. Third, maritime trade continuity and supply-chain resilience, coordinating responses to disruptions affecting ports, sea lanes, logistics hubs, and insurance flows to ensure the steady movement of goods. The proposed cell could operate on an annual rotation among ASEAN chairs, with India as co-host, and provide quarterly progress updates from the Secretariat to all member states. And a small, dedicated core team, a director on a two-year rotational term, and a liaison officer from India embedded to ensure continuity with New Delhi’s desk and operational links.


Benefits: Create habits of cooperation and operational predictability without triggering formal commitment, deepen professional familiarity among maritime partners. Routine engagement rather than episodic contact lowers the risk of unintended escalation by normalising information exchange and clarifying expectations.


Obstacles: Diverse strategic outlooks and inconsistent political willingness among ASEAN members could limit broader involvement. Some states remain cautious about initiatives that may be perceived as aligning too closely with major-power competition, particularly given sensitivities surrounding China and the United States. Concerns over entrapment, coupled with shifts in domestic priorities, may disrupt continuity and slow collective commitment.


Addressing this divide requires minimising binary choices and prioritising functional cooperation over strategic alignment. Participation should remain flexible, enabling members to engage selectively in areas consistent with national priorities, thereby lowering political costs. Anchoring the initiative within ASEAN-led mechanisms can reinforce ASEAN centrality and mitigate perceptions of external balancing. Additionally, the cell’s mandate should prioritise shared, low-sensitivity objectives such as disaster response, search and rescue, and civilian-oriented maritime domain awareness. These functional areas can build trust and cultivate incremental habits of cooperation despite differing strategic orientations.


Mitigation: To enhance feasibility, the proposed cell should adopt a voluntary, issue-based entry model linked to ASEAN-led forums to preserve inclusivity. Activities should remain transparent, functionally driven, and anchored within ASEAN’s political frameworks. By prioritising flexibility, consensus-building, and low-sensitivity cooperation areas, the initiative can navigate intra-ASEAN differences while sustaining momentum.


2.Indo-ASEAN Maritime Capacity and Skill Exchange


Drawing inspiration from existing fellowship and professional exchange models, such as those developed under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), India should establish a maritime capacity and skill exchange programme with ASEAN partners. The initiative should combine short-term technical training with access to shared digital and logistical tools, while allowing participating states to select components aligned with their national priorities rather than adopting fixed packages.


Such an approach would strengthen regional maritime governance by enhancing the ability of states to enforce maritime law and counter illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) activities. It would also build the technical and analytical capabilities required to monitor and manage expansive exclusive economic zones. Integrating digital surveillance platforms and sensor networks into a shared operating picture could further improve coordination and situational awareness.


To maximise practical value, exchanges should be structured around real-world operational challenges rather than generic naval drills. Participating countries would both teach and learn, fostering deeper professional familiarity in areas such as maritime practices, logistics, and command procedures. Over time, this could translate technical cooperation into governance outcomes, contributing to clearer jurisdictional coordination and more effective implementation of maritime law.


Benefits: This approach would strengthen local maritime governance and institutional capacity. Rather than limiting cooperation to skill transfer, it would improve enforcement coordination across maritime agencies. By enhancing implementation capacity, the initiative would also reinforce ASEAN-led norms without creating parallel security structures.


Obstacles: Unequal capacity to absorb assistance and external influence may interfere with uptake. Some partners may struggle to translate exchanged expertise into sustained policy or institutional reform, particularly where additional funding, staffing, and bureaucratic buy-in across multiple agencies are required.


Mitigation: Begin with pilot plans and projects and expand only after demonstrating local feedback. Align the program with existing ASEAN mechanisms to reinforce legitimacy and avoid perceptions of external imposition.

 

Conclusion


The maritime domain is transactional, divisible and central to regional stability. ASEAN’s dilemma today is fundamentally operational rather than ideological: to keep the sea lanes open and manage maritime incidents rather than choosing sides. Maritime cooperation allows progress without alignment. India fits naturally into this framework because its approach lowers political and strategic costs, and boosts the capacity building, coordination, and governance over exclusivity. Postponement does not safeguard autonomy; it deepens vulnerability, allowing pressure to accumulate in unmanaged spaces. Maritime order is ultimately sustained not by rhetoric, but by the capacity of regional partners to manage risks collectively when it matters the most.

 

 

 

Works Cited

“China and Philippines Both Claim Control of Disputed Sandy Cay reef.” The Washington Post, 28 Apr. 2025,

“Emphasis on Dialogue and Cooperation: ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” World Insight, 16 Jun. 2022

“India Pledges $680 Million in Economic Support to Mauritius.” Reuters, 11 Sept. 2025,

“Philippines, India Hold First Joint Sail in the South China Sea.” Reuters, 4 Aug. 2025,

UNCTAD. Review of Maritime Transport 2024. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 23 Apr. 2025

 

 
 
 

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