Ceasefire in Myanmar: ASEAN’s Comeback or a Geopolitical Coincidence

By A. Peyson Hunt

Myanmar has been engulfed in a devastating civil war since the military overthrew the democratically elected civilian government in 2021 and created the State Administration Council (SAC). This conflict has seen the military combat a coalition of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the shadow National Unity Government (NGU). Over the past four years, there have been attempts by almost every regional nation and group of nations to find a peaceful solution to the conflict without success. This past March a devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck the nation near the city of Mandalay resulting in the deaths of more than 3,700 people and widespread destruction. Since this tragic natural disaster, the SAC and NGU have announced a humanitarian ceasefire that has largely held up to the surprise of many within the region with the current ASEAN Chair, Malaysia, acting as a go-between for the SAC and NGU. China has also exerted more pressure on the military government to find a way to stem the refugee flows and protect their Belt and Road investments in the region. This welcome development brings us to the question: is this ceasefire a product of ASEAN diplomacy, Chinese pressure, or simply a moment of necessity? While this truce appears to be more coincidental than coordinated, it could mark the beginning of a broader opportunity for ASEAN to reclaim a meaningful role in Myanmar’s peace process.

China’s Invisible Hand

China finds itself embroiled in a new Cold War, escalating trade war, faltering economy, and youth employment crisis. These factors are bad enough without having to account for a surge of impoverished refugees crossing into Yunnan Province from Myanmar and the collapse of their Belt and Road Initiative investments. While China focuses on confronting the United States in the Pacific, the regional stability of Southeast Asia is critical. There is little doubt that China has been the most critical source of support for the isolated SAC, giving Beijing unparalleled leverage over the military government. Both China and ASEAN desire a peaceful solution to the Myanmar civil war, but who deserves more credit for the current ceasefire is hard to determine at present.

Malaysia Steps In: A New Diplomatic Channel

Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, has taken on the role of mediator in the ongoing discussions between the SAC and NGU in a surprising shift from the previous reluctance of both sides to peace talks. Over the preceding weeks, the Malaysian Prime Minister was able to meet with both the SAC’s Min Aung Hlaing and representatives from the NUG. Given that Malaysia is the current chair nation, this was a major departure from ASEAN’s usual non-interference and passive stance on the conflict. In April of 2021 ASEAN had adopted the Five Point Consensus as an attempt to address the escalating crisis unfolding within Myanmar. The plan included an immediate ceasefire, constructive dialogue among all parties, an ASEAN special envoy, humanitarian assistance, and meetings with all parties and the special envoy. The Five Point Consensus, even though adopted quickly after the beginning of the crisis, was stonewalled by the SAC, remained largely symbolic, lack real leverage over any party, and weighed down by internal divergences over the conflict. In short: the Five-Point Consensus became a diplomatic dead letter, symbolizing ASEAN’s limited leverage and inability to act decisively when member states defy collective agreements. Despite this disappointing outcome, ASEAN remained the only legitimate regional platform with modest, but active, engagement with all sides.

ASEAN Pivot or Malaysian Opportunism?

Given the rapid evolution of ASEAN’s role in the conflict and the resulting ceasefire agreements, it is worth asking the question whether Malaysia is leveraging its ASEAN chairmanship for independent action or is this a wider shift in ASEAN’s position regarding the conflict? There is historical context for a chair nation taking action and leveraging their position of leadership to drive regional peace efforts, as Indonesia did in Cambodia in 1990, but in that case, Cambodia was not yet a member nation. However, in this current conflict, it is a member nation embroiled in a domestic civil war. ASEAN’s core principles of non-interference are being redefined, if not directly challenged. Is this institutional ASEAN acting, or just Malaysia in ASEAN’s clothing driving a peace effort that is long overdue? The current state of the conflict is ripe for a ceasefire. There has been an ongoing humanitarian crisis since before the civil war, but the earthquake has brought the suffering to a new level and added international attention. The militaries of both sides have traded territory and casualties to a point of mutual fatigue. This ceasefire allows all sides to consolidate their positions, dig in, and assess their next move. Lastly, external pressure from the re-invigorated international attention and Chinese concern over their BRI investments and refugee flows have added to the momentum building towards this ceasefire.

Fragile Peace, Fragile Diplomacy                            

This nascent ceasefire is still extremely fragile but is the first real movement towards peace since the start of the conflict in 2021. Whether the agreement is a result of ASEAN’s revived diplomacy, China’s backroom pressure on the SAC, or simply the culmination of necessity following the recent earthquake remains uncertain. Malaysia deserves credit for seizing the opportunity as ASEAN chair where past chairs have either shied away or not been given the ingredients needed for the current ceasefire. Even so, China’s role looms large. Even though ASEAN remains the only regional body with access to both the SAC and NGU, China holds all the leverage via economic pressure and political coverage. Beijing’s concerns over refugee flows into Yunnan and BRI investments going sour undoubtedly contributed to moving the military government towards the negotiating table. The earthquake’s humanitarian fallout, general conflict fatigue, and renewed international attention came together to create the conditions necessary for these dynamics to align. The viability of the ceasefire and future peace in Myanmar will be contingent on ASEAN’s ability to collaborate with China. Progress on some joint ASEAN-China efforts like the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) have been slow, but the two parties have managed to work together on major initiatives like the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) suggesting collaboration is possible when both parties are motivated. While the ceasefire may be a product of circumstance, shaped by conflict fatigue, natural disaster, and external pressure, it offers a fleeting opportunity for ASEAN to seize the reins of leadership and steer the peace process in a uniquely ASEAN way. To capitalize on this moment, ASEAN and China could begin by cooperating on confidence-building measures, monitoring mechanisms, and humanitarian initiatives that lay the groundwork for a more durable peace. This ceasefire, fragile as it is, represents a moment of possibility. For ASEAN, it offers a chance to evolve its role in regional peace and security, but only if it capitalizes on its momentum. Whether this ceasefire remains a fleeting coincidence or becomes a turning point for regional diplomacy will ultimately depend on ASEAN’s willingness to seize the moment.