Spoiler Typology and the Case of the MILF–GPH Peace Process in the Philippines

Dan Kristian Rivera

Master’s Candidate in Peace Studies, Conflict Analysis

Silliman University

Dan Kristian Rivera completed his bachelor’s degree in Political Science at Saint Columban College in 2024. In the same year, he participated in an academic fellowship at the University of Nebraska at Omaha under the YSEALI Civic Education Program. He is currently a master’s candidate at Silliman University, majoring in Peace and Conflict Studies. His research interests include terrorist profiles and leadership, mediation and negotiation, the security landscape in BARMM, Philippines and the Middle East, and inclusion as a peace framework.

Abstract

This paper explores the peace process between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Philippines (GPH), highlighting efforts to address the root causes of conflict after years of sporadic clashes and violence, particularly in Mindanao—the second-largest island in the southern Philippines, farthest from the capital, Manila, and long recognized as a focal point in the country’s history of conflict and peacebuilding. Using a literature-based method and critical review, the study examines the concept of spoilers in conflict, categorizes their types, and analyzes their impact on peace processes. It argues that inclusive stakeholder engagement and early identification of spoilers are essential to strengthening peacebuilding across contexts.

Keywords: Philippine Government, Militia, Autonomy, Governance, Peace, Conflict, Peacebuilding, BARMM, Mindanao, Peace Process

Introduction

Understanding spoilers in conflict is crucial for analyzing how, when, why, and where a conflict may escalate over time. Scholars offer various definitions of spoilers in peace processes. According to Stedman (1997), spoilers are leaders or groups who view peace negotiations as threats to their power, beliefs, or interests and resort to violence to undermine these efforts. Similarly, Newman and Richmond (2006) describe spoilers as groups or tactics that intentionally obstruct, delay, or weaken conflict resolution for various motives.

Kastrati (2014) highlights that central to these definitions is the idea that spoilers are any parties opposing peaceful conflict resolution for different reasons. These actors may be involved in or excluded from the peace process and can use violence or other obstructive means to disrupt progress while pursuing their own goals. Spoilers may also include those who initially participate in peace talks but later withdraw and attempt to derail the process. Additionally, some join negotiations only when it serves their interests, without a genuine commitment to peace. Beyond local conflict parties, external actors often influence negotiations. These external spoilers can be governments, diaspora groups, multinational corporations, and others who benefit from ongoing conflict and instability.

In summary, peace spoilers are organizations, individuals, or entities that deliberately block or delay the peace process under negotiation. Their presence is critical to understanding the peace pact between the MILF and the Government of the Philippines because spoilers can infiltrate systems unnoticed, creating disruptions that range from minor setbacks to major obstacles undermining the vision of peace. They also illustrate that the pursuit of lasting peace is not universally shared, as social, political, economic, and other interests often drive resistance.

Understanding spoilers also means recognizing the warning signs within peace agreements, including those involving governments. In an ever-changing world with various conflicts, spoilers are often present—intentionally or unintentionally causing consequences that threaten peace. This runs contrary to United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16, which promotes peace, justice, and strong institutions.

The MILF, or Moro Islamic Liberation Front, serves as a strong example. It took years to build the peace pact, and when finally established, it has shown visible successes between the GPH and the MILF, as well as with support from NGOs, community organizations, and third parties, including international actors such as Malaysia, Japan, and the United States. Therefore, studying spoilers in the MILF peace process allows scholars and practitioners to identify the types of spoilers they may face in peace efforts, while considering the complex layers of conflict and peacebuilding worldwide.

Background and History of the MILF

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was founded by Hashim Salamat in 1978, emerging as a breakaway group from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) after the latter began engaging in peace negotiations with the Philippine government. The peace agreement between the MNLF and the government in 1989 led to the formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the MILF criticized the ARMM for lacking genuine autonomy, arguing that it remained dependent on the central government. The study of Rabinowitz (2013) revealed that true independence or meaningful autonomy was not evident in the establishment of ARMM, and the MILF split from the MNLF was a move to position itself as a more legitimate fight for independence and autonomy. A report published by GMA News (2018) stated that MILF deputy spokesman Khaled Musa said the abolition of Shariff Kabunsuan province was “irreversible proof that the ARMM has no autonomy at all. It is an administrative region by any yardstick and not autonomous.” Additionally, the MILF viewed the ARMM primarily as a failed model that did not address the real grievances of its people. Sakili (2012), in his paper, included former President Aquino himself acknowledging the ARMM as “a failed experiment.” That is why the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement was designed to replace the ARMM. This reflects the MILF’s long‑standing view that the framework and implementation of ARMM did not deliver genuine autonomy or address Moro grievances. Salamat Hashim, once a senior figure and close friend and ally of Nur Misuari, grew increasingly disillusioned with the MNLF’s compromises with Manila, particularly the 1996 Final Peace Agreement that created the ARMM. Salamat believed the settlement fell short of true self‑determination and feared it would entrench Moro subordination rather than resolve it (Macasalong, 2014). This frustration led Salamat to formally establish the MILF in the late 1970s, positioning it as a rival movement that rejected the MNLF’s negotiated autonomy.

In spoiler typology terms, the MILF acted as a “spoiler” during the MNLF–Philippine government talks by undermining the legitimacy of the ARMM and refusing to recognize the peace agreement as a genuine solution, rejecting peace pacts outright. Their continued armed struggle and refusal to participate in the ARMM framework weakened the implementation of the accord, which in turn complicated Manila’s efforts to consolidate peace and signaled to Moro communities that the settlement was insufficient.

MILF’s Role in the Peace Process

The MILF initially acted as a spoiler during the peace process led by the MNLF and the GPH, rejecting the 1996 peace agreement and continuing its armed struggle by attacking security forces, particularly in the southern Philippines. The MILF viewed the peace pact as inadequate and limited, failing to address the root causes of the Moro people’s suffering. The MILF eventually entered its own peace process with the GPH. Encouraged by the success of the MNLF peace pact, then‑President Fidel V. Ramos sent peace overtures to the MILF in late 1996, which initiated formal talks between the two parties.

Following years of negotiations and peacebuilding, the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro marked the culmination of efforts between the MILF and GPH. In 2018, the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) was enacted by Congress, replacing the ARMM with the BARMM. Through this accord, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) was institutionalized, granting the Moro people autonomy and self‑governance within a peace framework that included combatant decommissioning and socio‑economic measures such as livelihood programs and community development projects (Loesch, 2017).

In 2019, the decommissioning of combatants began, with thousands of weapons surrendered. From 2021 to the present, BARMM has been governed by the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, the de facto government led by MILF, with MNLF leaders included and awaiting the official elections scheduled for September 2026.

This trajectory demonstrates that spoilers can be transformed into peace partners when they are brought to the negotiating table and when inclusion, security, and identity concerns are adequately addressed.

Author’s Analytical Framework: Typology of Spoilers in the MILF - GPH Peace Process

Spoiler Type and Definitions	Key Spoilers	Impact on Peace Process
Limited Spoilers - Have specific, narrow goals (e.g., political concessions, security guarantees).	Rogue MILF factions, MNLF splinters seeking autonomy or concessions.	Distrust, miscommunication, false information, delay, radicalization, misrepresentation
Greedy Spoilers - Flexible goals that stretch or contract depending on cost-benefit possibilities.	Local political clans or groups, militant groups, that escalate demands depending on leverage. Media and false information. Government and private entities.	Political/Social/Legal influence in the peace process
Total Spoilers - Seek absolute power or dominance, rejecting any compromise.	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), ISIS-inspired groups, extremist factions rejecting peace outright.	Attacks, secession, violence

Recommendations

Layered identification and Group Contextualization

In general, spoilers and their roles in peace processes differ depending on the parties involved. For example, in a conflict between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Communist Party of the Philippines New People’s Army (CPP–NPA), Moro‑associated groups may not be direct spoilers or may not be spoilers at all in the case since the conflict does not concern them. This highlights the need for contextual analysis: peace processes must be examined in relation to the specific actors, their histories, and affiliations. With this contextualization, it aligns with conflict resolution scholarship (Stedman, 1997), which emphasizes that spoilers cannot be understood in isolation but only within the dynamics of the conflict system.

Understanding History and Stories Before Academic Methods

Additionally, while Kastrati’s study highlights methods such as power‑sharing agreements, security guarantees, sanctions, incentives, and trust‑building, this paper emphasizes the importance of first identifying and observing all layers of the parties involved before applying such measures. To truly achieve peacebuilding, leadership analysis and background analysis are critical tools here, as they allow practitioners to map interests, grievances, and potential spoiler behavior. Thus, this sequencing ensures that interventions are not only technically sound but also contextually grounded, which is more real and genuine.

Spoilers often seek attention—whether immediate or long‑term—and can become major obstacles if not properly managed. Academic literature on spoiler theory, such as in the study of Newman & Richmond (2006), notes that groups may reject agreements not only due to substantive grievances but also to maintain visibility, relevance, or bargaining power. Their idea on visibility and acting to remain relevant was an expanded theory from Stedman (1997).

The actions of spoilers vary depending on the circumstances, but seeking visibility and attention during negotiations may involve violent attacks or sabotage to maintain bargaining power and ensure that they remain relevant in the political landscape. Recognizing this dynamic allows mediators to design strategies that either co‑opt spoilers through incentives or contain them through sanctions, depending on their motivations and capacities.

Inclusive Stakeholder Engagement

Future peace processes should enhance stakeholder engagement by involving local communities, political actors, and even dissenting factions. Inclusive participation is not only normatively desirable but also strategically important because this helps identify potential spoilers early and reduces the risks of disruption or escalation. Participatory peacebuilding suggests that broad inclusion and representation strengthens legitimacy and creates social ownership of agreements, thereby limiting the space for spoilers to mobilize opposition.

The case of the MILF illustrates how a former spoiler can evolve into a legitimate political actor. From an armed revolutionary movement, the MILF now heads the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, the interim government created under the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). This transformation demonstrates that spoilers are not static; under the right conditions, they can shift from obstructing peace to sustaining it. The MILF’s trajectory underscores the importance of adaptive strategies that allow spoilers to be integrated into formal governance structures, thereby turning potential disruptors into stakeholders in peace.

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